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Abstract  
Fisheries worldwide continue to suffer from the negative consequences of open 
access.  In 1986, New Zealand responded by establishing an individual transferable quota 
(ITQ) system that by 1998 included 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas.  
We assess these markets in terms of trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the 
fundamentals determining quota prices.  We find that market activity is sufficiently high to 
support a competitive market and that price dispersion has decreased over time. Using a 15-
year panel dataset, we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the 
relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, 
ecological variability, and market interest rates.  Controlling for these factors, our results 
show an increase in quota prices, consistent with increased profitability. Overall, the results 
suggest these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective 
instruments for efficient fisheries management. 
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Fishing Quota Markets 
Richard Newell, James Sanchirico, and Suzi Kerr* 
1.  Introduction 
Economists Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) identified the “common pool” problem of 
fisheries almost 50 years ago, predicting that open access would lead to excess fishing effort, 
dissipation of rents, and inefficient depletion of fish populations. Unfortunately, the prediction 
has been borne out. To take just one example, after two decades of rapid expansion of fishing 
effort, the New England groundfish fishery collapsed and has been essentially closed since 1994. 
Throughout the world approximately 25% of the major fish stocks are currently in jeopardy of 
collapsing (FAO 2001).  
Until the early 1980s, most fisheries were either completely unmanaged or managed 
under command-and-control regulations that governed the size of vessels, type of nets, season 
length, and which areas are open to fishing. Such regulations fail to check the number of vessels 
or the level of fishing effort, and they encourage fishermen to work around equipment 
constraints. Under these regulations, a fisherman has no sense of ownership over the fish until 
they are caught. This creates a race to fish, and the historical record shows that the race will 
continue until fish stocks are depleted and the number and types of vessels in a fishery exceeds 
its viable capacity. 
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Individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems are a promising means to correct this market 
failure.1  They limit fishing operations by setting a total allowable catch (TAC), which is 
typically allocated in perpetuity to fishing participants based on historical catch.  Because the 
aggregate catch is capped and fishermen have access to a guaranteed share of the TAC, this 
approach significantly reduces the likelihood that fish stocks are overfished and the incentives to 
engage in a race to fish.2  In addition, when transferability of the shares is permitted, the least 
efficient vessels will find it more profitable to sell their quotas rather than fish them. Over time, 
this should both reduce excess capacity and increase the efficiency of vessels operating in the 
fishery.  
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, when countries began to “enclose the commons” by 
establishing exclusive economic zones in the ocean off their coasts, more than 15 countries 
followed New Zealand’s and Iceland’s lead in establishing ITQ systems.  To date, ITQs are used 
to manage over 60 species, including 4 in the United States (OECD 1997).  New Zealand alone 
has over 30 species within their ITQ system.  Although assessments of these programs are 
generally positive, their future is unclear.3  For example,  a moratorium on implementing new 
                                                 
1 Landing fees or other price-based policies represent an alternative to quantity-based policies such as tradable 
quota.  While either price or quantity instruments can attain equivalent outcomes in a deterministic setting,  
uncertainty leads to differences in the efficiency of these alternatives, and instrument preference depends on the 
nature of the uncertainty (Weitzman (2002). 
2 Several benefits arise from allocating shares of the TAC to individual fishermen, including relaxing of controls on 
season length and the ability of fishermen to shift to quality from maximizing quantity. For example, since the 
introduction in 1994 of an ITQ system in the Alaskan halibut fishery, the season length has grown from two 24-hour 
openings to more than 200 days. The flexibility to time fishing trips when port prices are higher, and the elimination 
of large supply gluts of fresh product, have resulted in increases in price per pound of more than 40% (Casey et al. 
1995). The focus on quality is also evident in New Zealand, where fishermen have changed catching methods in the 
red snapper fishery in order to sell their catch on the highly profitable Japanese live fish market (Dewees 1998). 
3 The existing literature on ITQ programs, although extensive, is dominated by description and anecdotal evidence 
of their effects (NRC 1999).  There are, however, a few notable exceptions.  Recent work by Grafton et al. (2000) 
uses firm-level data from the British Columbia halibut fishery spanning pre- and post-ITQ periods to estimate a 
stochastic production frontier.  They find evidence of substantial gains in revenues and producer surplus and predict 
that the gains in producer surplus could be five times higher if restrictions on transferability were not in place. Other 
studies quantitatively assess ITQs using relationships estimated on either pre- or post-ITQ catch-effort data to 
predict changes in fleet restructuring, costs, and revenues (Squires et al. 1994; Wang 1995; Weninger 1998).  Such 
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ITQ systems has been in place in the U.S. since 1996 while policymakers have debated various 
design elements, including whether quota should be transferable.4   
For ITQs to deliver an efficient solution to the common pool problem in practice, it is 
critical that fisherman can buy and sell quotas in a competitive market and that quota markets 
convey appropriate price signals.  Assuming competitive markets, rational asset pricing theory 
suggests that quota prices should reflect the expected present value of future rents in the fishery.5  
Price signals sent through the quota market are therefore an essential source of information on 
the expected profitability of fishing and an important criterion for decisions to enter, exit, 
expand, or contract individual fishing activity.  Quota prices also send signals to policymakers 
about the economic and biological health of a fishery.  Some have suggested quota prices could 
therefore be used as a measurement tool for the dynamic adjustment of TACs to optimize policy 
outcomes (Arnason 1990). 
Establishing an empirical record of how well “created markets” work in practice is 
important not only for fisheries policy, but also in many other resource areas where the 
advantages of market-based policies hinge in part on market performance.  This is especially true 
since economists frequently recommend market-based quantity instruments and building the 
institutions necessary to implement them can require significant political and economic costs. 
Assessments of the U.S. sulfur dioxide tradable permit system (Joskow et al. 1998; Carlson et al. 
2000; Stavins 1998) are significant contributions in this regard.  
In theory, ITQ programs are analogous to other cap and trade programs, such as the U.S. 
tradable permit program for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants.   However, 
                                                                                                                                                             
predictions are based on the assumption that the market for fishing rights is operating efficiently, but whether that is 
likely to hold in practice remains an open question, which we address herein. 
4 In addition to the transferability question, other contentious issues include whether shares should have limited 
duration, whether shareholders must remain active in the fishery, and whether processors should be allowed to hold 
quota. 
5 See Cochrane (2001) for a survey of the large literature on asset pricing, and Karpoff (1989) and Stefanou and 
Wilen (1992) for conceptual application to fishing licenses.    4
there may be important differences between pollution permit markets and fishing quota markets 
in practice.  For instance, controlling and forecasting emissions from a power plant is arguably 
easier than predicting both the level of catch on any trip and its composition.  This is especially 
true in multi-species fisheries where fish populations cannot be directly targeted without 
incidental catch of other stocks.  Thus, fishermen operating under a quota management system 
will likely need to rebalance their portfolio of quota holdings throughout the year to match catch 
levels—a task that some argue is simply too complex (Copes 1986; Squires et al. 1998).  
Although recent experience with the sulfur dioxide trading program has changed many 
perceptions, skeptics still question whether tradable permit systems and other economic 
incentive-based policies can work in practice.  Potential concerns include the degree of liquidity 
and transaction costs in such markets as well as information problems related to uncertainty and 
decision-making complexity.6  In fact, many detractors of ITQ systems claim that these concerns 
are more likely in a fishery setting, because of ex ante uncertainty in production levels and 
participants’ supposed lack of financial sophistication.  
Such skepticism is in part warranted by the limited number of opportunities for careful 
research on how well created markets have performed in general and particularly in fisheries.7  
                                                 
6 Another important issue is whether there exists potential for market power and strategic manipulation of market 
prices (Hahn 1984; Anderson 1991). We leave this question to future research. Nonetheless, given that the output 
market for fish in New Zealand trades at a world price, the ability of firms to exercise market power in the quota 
market would seem to be limited.  In addition, there are distributional issues such as consolidation and aggregation 
of quota associated with trading that we do not assess in this paper, although these are clearly important political 
issues. We note that we do observe some fisheries with significant reductions in quota owners, yet there remains a 
large number of small quota owners today. 
7 There is, however, a significant literature investigating aspects of market efficiency in a variety of markets, 
including those for financial assets (Fama 1998, Cochrane 2001), housing (Case and Shiller 1989), art (Geotzmann 
1993, Psendao 1993), and natural resources. Within this large literature, the most closely related to our research is 
work on markets for lease and sale of land, oil fields, and forest tracts, which like fishing rights are valued primarily 
for the direct flow of rents from their productive use. For example, Burt (1986) found that rents (i.e., net revenues) 
are the fundamental driver of farmland prices, and that there is little evidence prices are driven by market 
speculation. The literature on offshore oil field leases and U.S. Forest Service timberland leases has focused mainly 
on the efficiency of auction mechanisms and the implications for bid prices (e.g., Paddock, Siegel, and Smith 1988; 
Porter 1995; Athey and Levin 2001). The work by Karpoff (1984, 1985) investigating the economic information 
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Several studies present descriptive statistics on annual quota prices and number of trades 
(Lindner et al. 1992, Arnason 1993, Batstone and Sharp 1999, Dinneford et al. 1999).  For 
example, using two years of data on quota sale and lease prices from the New Zealand ITQ 
system, Lindner et al. (1992) attempt to measure economic rents, but conclude that a more 
thorough analysis of the determinants of quota prices is needed to properly assess market 
performance and rents.   
To establish an empirical record on market performance for fishing quotas, we use the 
most comprehensive data set on ITQ markets gathered to date for the largest system of its kind in 
the world.  The panel dataset from New Zealand covers 15 years of transactions across 33 
species and includes price and quantity data on transactions in more than 150 fish stock markets 
(see Table 1 and Data Appendix).  Markets exist in New Zealand both for selling the perpetual 
right to fish a certain quota stock and for leasing quotas.  A unique aspect of our data is the 
breadth of markets and the cross-sectional heterogeneity, as the market characteristics are diverse 
across both economic and ecological dimensions.  For example, average life spans range from 
one year for squid (Nototodarus gouldi) to 145-plus years for orange roughy (Hoplostethus 
atlanticus). Some species, such as red snapper (Pagrus auratus), occupy inshore and shallow 
habitat  and are targeted with trawl gear, set netting, and long lining. Others, such as orange 
roughy, are found offshore in depths over 1,000 meters and require large vessels and very 
specialized trawling gear. The quota markets also include abalone (Haliotis iris), rock lobster 
(Jasus edwardsii), and other shellfish and crustacean fisheries where potting, diving, and 
dredging are the most common harvesting techniques. The export value of these species 
                                                                                                                                                             
embedded in limited-entry license prices of the Alaskan salmon fishery is also relevant, because these license prices 
in theory reflect the expected present value of future rents.    6
currently ranges from about NZ$700 per ton for jack mackerel to about NZ$40,000 per ton for 
rock lobster.8 
We investigate how these markets have performed in a number of ways.  First, by 
assessing the overall level and trends in market liquidity and participation across the markets, we 
establish whether the right conditions are in place for these markets to function well.  If these 
markets have few participants and low liquidity, noisy price signals could ensue reducing the 
expected efficiency gains.  With active fishing quota markets and relatively low transactions 
costs, we would expect price dispersion to decrease over time to a reasonable level.  Another 
aspect of well-functioning markets is that asset prices represent underlying fundamentals and 
behave in an economically rational way.  If, as many claim, prices reported in these markets are 
fictitious and confounded by the inclusion of other assets (e.g., boats and gear), we should not 
find any meaningful relationship between quota prices and their underlying fundamentals 
(Lindner et al. 1992).9  Finally, if quota prices reveal relevant asset arbitrage information, we 
should expect the rate of return to fish quotas to be comparable with other financial assets in the 
New Zealand economy.  We test this proposition by investigating the relationship between the 
prices of perpetual quota sales and annual quota leases relative to measures of the market rate of 
interest.10 
We find that there has typically been a sufficiently high and increasing level of market 
activity, suggesting there is adequate support for a competitive market.  Although some specific 
markets are thin, they tend to be economically and ecologically unimportant.   The  magnitude of 
price dispersion is comparable with typical findings in other markets, and the downward trend in 
                                                 
8 Throughout this paper, monetary figures are year 2000 New Zealand dollars, which are typically worth about half a 
U.S. dollar. Tons are metric tons. 
9 As noted in the data appendix, we do in fact observe a number of questionable price observations in the data.  
These observations are easily identified, however, and do not appear to limit the ability of the remaining data to send 
meaningful market information.  
10 Due to a lack of information on the individual costs of fishing, we do not assess whether marginal fishing costs 
are being equalized under the ITQ system—another condition underlying efficient fishery management.   7
dispersion is consistent with an adjustment period of learning and market development.  We also 
find evidence of economically rational behavior in these markets through the relationship 
between quota lease and sale prices and fishing input and output prices, relative quota demand, 
ecological variability, and market rates of return.   
Moreover, after controlling for relevant factors, we see an increase in the value of quota 
prices over the history of the ITQ program, consistent with an increase in the profitability of the 
included fisheries. This is particularly true for fish stocks that faced significant  reductions in 
total allowable catch relative to historic catch levels. Overall, the results suggest these markets 
are operating reasonably well, implying that market-based quota systems are potentially effective 
instruments for efficient fisheries management.  At the same time, available evidence indicates 
that the biological health of the fish populations within the ITQ system is certainly no worse off, 
in some cases shows clear signs of recovery, and in other cases is likely to be improving given 
current TAC levels (Annala et al 2000).11 
In section 2, we describe the forces behind the adoption of an ITQ system in New 
Zealand, the legislative history of this program, and its basic design.  In section 3, we analyze the 
development of the market for quota sales and derivative leases, and trends in market activity 
and the number of quota owners.  We also investigate the law of one price in both the lease and 
sale markets.  In section 4, we investigate econometrically the determinants of quota lease and 
sale prices, as well as the relationship between these two markets and the market interest rate. 
We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of our findings and areas of further study. 
                                                 
11   There are, however, some important caveats.  First, for over half of the fish stocks, sufficient data to measure 
changes in fish populations over the course of the program do not exist.  Second, the duration of the program is too 
short to assess whether measures taken to improve fish stocks with very long lifespans (e.g., orange roughy) are 
succeeding.   8
2.  New Zealand’s Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) System  
Although the New Zealand fishing industry accounts for less than 1% of the world’s 
fishing output, it contributes NZ$1.7 billion annually to the New Zealand gross domestic 
product. Seafood is the fourth largest export earner, and more than 90% of fishing industry 
revenue is derived from exports. New Zealand is currently considered a world leader in fisheries 
management, in both environmental and economic terms. This was not the case, however, prior 
to the implementation of its ITQ system.12 
Before 1976, New Zealand fishery policy focused primarily on the development of 
inshore fisheries, leaving offshore fisheries to Japanese, Soviet, and Korean factory trawlers. 
This focus began to shift, however, after New Zealand extended its exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) to 200 miles in 1978, which had the effect of “nationalizing” the waters where the 
offshore fisheries reside. Subsidized loans, duty-free imports of large fishing vessels, and price 
supports were all used by the government to promote domestic production in the offshore 
fishery. In 1983, after a series of joint venture programs with foreign and domestic fishing 
interests, the New Zealand government established a quota-based system for nine companies 
fishing seven offshore species. Quotas were allocated to each company for a ten-year period 
based on investment in catch and processing capital, although as described below, this program 
was absorbed three years later by a more comprehensive ITQ system. Trading and leasing of 
shares are reported to have occurred (Sissenwine and Mace 1992), but the system did not provide 
an adequate mechanism for the transfer of quotas.  
While the government was encouraging the development of offshore fisheries, inshore 
fisheries were beginning to exhibit signs of overfishing. The catch of red snapper, for instance—
                                                 
12 For further history and institutional detail, see the many descriptive assessments of New Zealand fisheries 
management: Crothers (1988), Clark et al. (1988), Pearse (1991), Sissenwine and Mace (1992), Boyd and Dewees 
(1992), Annala (1996), Dewees (1999), Batstone and Sharpe (1999), Yandle (2001), Clement & Associates (1997), 
New Zealand Official Yearbook (2001), and SeaFic (2001).   9
a commercially important inshore species—had peaked in 1978 and fallen by 43% by 1983. As 
far back as the early 1960s, the government had instituted programs to encourage the growth of 
the inshore fishing industry, which resulted in increases in fishing effort. These subsidies for an 
industry in a regulated open-access setting are cited as the main reasons for excess capacity and 
depleted fish populations in the inshore fisheries in the early 1980s.  
Inshore fisheries depletion, the development of the quota-based program for offshore 
fisheries, and the general orientation of the government in the 1980s toward deregulation, 
combined to create an atmosphere conducive for fundamental change in New Zealand fisheries 
management. After several years of consultation with industry, the Fisheries Amendment Act of 
1986 passed, creating New Zealand’s ITQ system. Modifying legislation has been passed several 
times since, but the basic structure of the system has remained intact. 
The ITQ system initially covered 17 inshore species and 9 offshore species, and 
expanded to a total of 33 species by 1998. Under the system, the New Zealand EEZ was 
geographically delineated into quota management regions for each species based on the location 
of major fish populations. Rights for catching fish were defined in terms of fish stocks that 
correspond to a specific species taken from a particular quota management region. In 1998, the 
total number of fishing quota markets stood at 157, ranging from 1 for hoki (Macruronus 
novaezelandiae) to 10 for abalone.13 As of 1996, the species managed under the ITQ system 
accounted for more than 85% of the total commercial catch taken from New Zealand’s EEZ.  
Fishing quotas are generally tradable only within the same fish stock, and not across 
regions or species or years, although there are some minor exceptions.14 The quota rights can be 
                                                 
13 We exclude region 10 from our analysis because this region was set up for administrative reasons (Yandle 2001) 
and is rarely if ever fished for any species. 
14 Given the uncertainty around quantity and composition of catch, quota holdings represent a mix of ex ante and ex 
post leases, purchases, and sales to cover actual catch.   Prior to leaving the dock, fishermen are required by law to 
hold quotas for their intended target fish stocks.   After returning from their trip, fishermen have a number of ways to 
balance their quota holdings and catches  (Clement & Associates 1997). First, fishermen have 30 days after landing 
their catch to arrange the quota to cover the various species caught.  Second, a “by-catch trade-off exemption” 
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broken up and sold in smaller quantities and any amount may be leased and subleased. There is 
no restriction on the number of times quotas can be leased, subleased, or sold. The New Zealand 
Ministry of Fisheries sets an annual total allowable catch for each fish stock based on a 
biological assessment as well as other relevant environmental, social, and economic factors. The 
TACs are set with a goal of moving the fish population toward a level that will support the 
largest possible annual catch (i.e., maximum sustainable yield), after an allowance for 
recreational and other noncommercial fishing.  Consequently, the TAC will differ from the 
economic efficient level that takes into account the intertemporal stock externalities inherent in 
common pool resource extraction.15 There are also legislative limits on aggregation for particular 
stocks and regions, and limitations on foreign quota holdings.16 The significant degree of 
flexibility built into the system suggests that transactions costs will be low and activity will 
potentially be high.  Compliance and enforcement is undertaken through a detailed set of 
reporting procedures that track the flow of fish from a vessel to a licensed fish receiver (on land) 
to export records, along with an at-sea surveillance program including on-board observers (Boyd 
and Dewees 1992).17      
                                                                                                                                                             
allows fishermen who incidentally take non-target fish to offset the catch by using quota from a predetermined list of 
target species. Third, quota owners can carry forward to or borrow from the next year up to 10% of their quota; this 
right does not apply to leases. A fourth option is to enter into a non-monetary agreement to fish against another’s 
quota. Or a fisherman can surrender the catch to the government or pay a “deemed value,” which is set based on the 
nominal port price to discourage discarding of catch at sea and targeting stocks without sufficient quota (Annala 
1996).  
15 Here we use the term TAC to refer to the total allowable commercial catch, which under the New Zealand system 
is referred to as the TACC. For many species (e.g., offshore fish stocks) there is no interest from recreational anglers 
and the entire TAC is allocated to the commercial sector.  
16 Initially, the aggregation limits were on holding quota. Substantial changes were written into the 1996 Fisheries 
Act, one of which was changing the limits on holdings to ownership levels. The 1996 legislation also relaxed the 
aggregation limits for particular species and region combinations.  
17 In a survey of inshore fishermen based out of Auckland in 1987, Dewees (1998) found that 40% thought 
enforcement and 66% thought “highgrading” were potential problems with the ITQ management system.   
Highgrading is the practice of maximizing the quality of the catch to be counted against one’s quota by dumping less 
valuable fish over board.  These numbers dropped to 21% and 25% respectively by 1995.  In any event, all 
regulations based on landings, whether market-based or not, are susceptible to issues associated with reporting, 
which could stem from fishers throwing less valuable fish back or transferring their catch to vessels at sea.   11
Individual quotas were initially allocated to fishermen as fixed annual tonnages in 
perpetuity based on their average catch level over two of the years spanning 1982-1984 (Yandle 
2001). To increase industry support for the plan, the government allocated the quotas free of 
charge and allowed fishers to petition for a change in their initial allocation. The main reasons 
for introducing the system, however, were to rebuild the inshore fisheries and improve the 
economic conditions of the industry. By denominating quotas as fixed tonnages, the government 
was counting on its ability to purchase quotas on the open market if it wanted to reduce the total 
catch from a fishery.  Because the initial allocations—which were based on past catch 
histories—exceeded the maximum sustainable yield in some fisheries, the government bought 
back quota on two occasions prior to the implementation of the program.  Purchasing these 
quotas turned out to be expensive, however, as the government paid  NZ$45 million for 15,000 
tons of quotas from the inshore fisheries (Clark, Major, and Mollett 1988).  
Faced with the prospect of spending another NZ$100 million to further reduce TACs 
(Sissenwine and Mace 1992), the government switched from quota rights based on fixed 
tonnages to denominating the quotas as a share of the TAC beginning with the 1990 fishing year. 
In doing so, the burden of risk associated with uncertainty over future TAC levels was moved 
from the government to the industry. At the same time, the industry received compensation 
payments over a period to 1994 for TAC reductions (Annala 1996). 
The New Zealand ITQ system is a dynamic institution that has had many refinements 
since its beginnings more than 15 years ago. Nonetheless, the basic tenets of the system—setting 
a total allowable catch and leaving the market to determine the most profitable allocation of 
fishing effort—have remained intact.  
3.  Trends in Market Liquidity 
Whether market-based policy instruments are being applied to fish, pollution, land, or 
taxi medallions, the ability of firms to buy and sell quotas in a well-functioning market is  12
necessary for achieving efficiency gains. 18 In this section we assess the operation of the New 
Zealand ITQ market along the quantity dimension, in terms of the number of market participants 
and the level of market activity. Thin markets with few participants can lead to high transaction 
costs because buyers and sellers may have difficulty finding trading partners. With high 
transaction costs, transactions are less likely to occur, which could lead to noisy price signals and 
little or no efficiency gains (Noll 1982; Stavins 1995). Some tradable permit programs have in 
fact attracted an insufficient number of participants, resulting in a low level of market activity 
and minimal efficiency gains (Hahn and Hester 1989).  In addition to looking at market 
participation, we investigate whether the “law of one price” is typically satisfied within these 
quota markets and whether any price dispersion has decreased over time as these markets 
developed.   
3.1.  Market Participation, Entry, and Exit 
The number of quota owners in the New Zealand ITQ system has averaged about 1,500 
over the history of the program. Individual markets have had a median of 45 quota owners,  
ranging from 418 to just 1 owner in some small fisheries of low importance.   To place these 
numbers in context, there are about 250 utilities with permit allocations under the U.S. sulfur 
dioxide permit market (U.S. EPA 2002), and the New York City taxi market has approximately 
5,000 medallion owners (Schaller 2001).19 As we discuss in the next section, each of these cap-
and-trade programs has had enough participants to generate ample liquidity in their respective 
markets. 
                                                 
18 Of course if quota were auctioned off on a recurring basis there might be less of a need for a secondary quota 
market since there would be incentives in place for an efficient initial allocation.  New Zealand, however, allocated 
quotas at no charge based on historical catch levels.  Given that there is also ex ante uncertainty in the composition 
and size of catch and changing economic and biological conditions over time, a well-functioning quota market is a 
necessary condition for an efficient ITQ allocation.  
19 New York City’s taxi medallion system has operated on a free-market basis since just after World War II.   13
As illustrated in Figure 1, the total number of owners increased from a minimum of about 
1,300 in 1986 to 1,800 in 1990, falling since then to 1,400 in 1998. To give some additional 
sense of the variation across fishing stocks, we also present ownership trends by grouping 
species according to whether they are inshore, offshore, or shellfish (see Table 1).  The increase 
in quota owners from 1987 to 1990 was due to the addition of several shellfish species to the ITQ 
program,20 and the subsequent 22% overall decline was due to the exit of about 32% of inshore 
owners and 19% of shellfish owners from their peaks in 1989–1990. The median number of 
owners in individual fishing quota markets has fallen from 51 in 1986 to 42 in 1998.  One 
argument against implementing a quota-based system has been that the large fixed costs needed 
to purchase quotas to enter the fishery could create a barrier to entry that may not exist in other 
regulatory settings. We find that although there has been net exit in New Zealand’s ITQ system, 
there have been on average around 90 new quota owners entering the system per year since 
1990.21 
Why the difference in exit behavior between the offshore versus inshore and shellfish 
fisheries? As described in section 2, prior to the adoption of the full ITQ system, a subset of the 
offshore stocks were included in a quota-based system, which had the effect of limiting entry. At 
the same time, the inshore fisheries had excess capacity, especially near Auckland. One might 
therefore expect to find that rationalization in the form of exit from certain fisheries would be 
greater in the inshore and shellfish compared with the offshore fisheries, all else equal.  Figure 1 
also illustrates that reductions in any one fishing quota market do not generally correspond to 
                                                 
20 Although more than 800 shellfish quota owners were added in this period, the net increase in the total number of 
owners was only about 500 because many of these fishermen were already active in offshore and inshore ITQ 
markets. 
21 In addition to the efficiency reasons for an interest in entry, the debate about whether to implement market-based 
approaches in fisheries has focused on the distributional implications of potential concentration and industrialization 
of the fishery. Critics of quota management systems argue that implementing such a system will result in the loss of 
the small-scale fishermen, a claim analogous to those made for preservation of the family farm. Although these 
distributional concerns may be important, especially in the political realm, we generally leave them for another 
paper.   14
fishermen leaving the industry altogether. Rather, the data imply that the quota owners on 
average hold a portfolio of quotas and while some might be exiting, others are divesting from 
some stocks and investing in others.  For example, it is evident from Figure 1 that in 1986 almost 
all the inshore quota owners also owned quotas for the offshore stocks.22  
3.2.  Market Activity 
Markets exist in New Zealand both for selling the perpetual right to fish a certain quota 
stock and for leasing quotas.  In practice, virtually all leases are for a period of one year or less. 
Although there are no official statistics, the general belief among government officials and quota 
brokers is that a majority of the transactions between small and medium-sized quota owners are 
handled through brokers. Larger companies, on the other hand, typically have quota managers on 
staff and engage in bilateral trades with other large companies. Brokers advertise quota prices 
and quantities for sale or lease in trade magazines, newspapers, and on the Internet. A brokerage 
fee between 1% and 3% of the total value of the trade to be paid by the seller is standard. There 
is anecdotal evidence of speculative activity, but this practice is not widespread. In most 
transactions, brokers operate as matchmakers, not unlike real estate agents, whereby any spread 
between bid and ask prices accrues to the parties of the transaction. Thus, brokers tend to focus 
on repeat business and revenue from fees rather than profits from speculation.  
As one would predict from the flexibility of the rules on exchange and the high number 
of participants, transaction costs are reasonably low and the quota markets are indeed very 
active. More than 120,000 leases and 30,000 sales of quotas had occurred under the ITQ program 
                                                 
22 Over time the typical portfolio of quota for the median quota owner has essentially remained 3 fish stocks across 
3 species of fish (1 fish stock for shellfish).  This represents the large number of small fishing enterprises, which are 
geographically and species focused. The median quantity of quota owned in recent years is 5 metric tons, which is 
the minimum necessary to get a fishing permit.  The largest quota owners, on the other hand, held a much more 
diversified portfolio, with the largest portfolio increasing from 120 fish stocks across 30 species in 1987 to 155 fish 
stocks for 33 species in the 1998 fishing year. The largest ownership portfolios represent a mix of most species 
across most of the regions.  15
as of the end of the 1998 fishing year—an annual average of about 8,700 leases and 2,000 sales. 
This represents a complete sample because all transactions (sales and leases) must be recorded 
and submitted to the New Zealand government. The mean lease and sale quantities are 
approximately 30 and 16 tons, respectively.23  
The total number of leases has risen considerably, from about 2,000 in 1986 to 14,500 in 
1998. To get a sense not just of the aggregate market activity, but also of the activity at the 
individual fishing quota market level, Figure 2 illustrates the historical trends in the quota lease 
and sale markets as measured by the annual median across fish stocks of the net percentage 
leased and sold by fishing year.24 The figure shows that the median percentage of quota leased in 
these markets has risen consistently, from 14% in 1987 to 40% in 1998.  
The total number of quota sales has fluctuated, from highs of almost 3,250 sales in 1986 
and 1990 to a low of 1,150 sales in 1998. The high years correspond to the large initial quota 
allocations for most species in 1986 and for rock lobster in 1990. The median quota market 
shows the same pattern, with the percentage sold being as high as 18% in years of initial 
allocation (1986 and 1990), gradually decreasing in subsequent years to around 4% of total 
outstanding quotas per year in the late 1990s.  This pattern of sales is consistent with a period of 
rationalization and reallocation proximate to the initial allocation of quotas, with sales activity 
decreasing after the less profitable producers have exited.  
Although the typical ITQ market exhibits a reasonably high degree of activity, some 
individual quota markets are thin. The number of leases in the individual ITQ markets from 1986 
                                                 
23 We note that the sulfur dioxide permit market—considered robust and competitive (Joskow et al. 1998; 
Schmalensee et al. 1998; Stavins 1998)—has seen a total of about 9,600 transactions between economically distinct 
organizations since 1995, or about 1,400 per year on average (U.S. EPA 2002), and the average annual number of 
transfers of taxicab medallions in New York City since 1982 is about 800 (Schaller 2001). In recent years the sales 
volume in the New York City taxi medallion market has averaged about 3% of outstanding medallions annually, 
while the average rate over the last four decades has been about 6%. 
24 Fishing years run from October to September for all species except rock lobster, packhorse rock lobster, and 
scallops, which run from April to March.  16
to 1998 ranges from about 30 to 3,500, the median being 645 leases. The number of sales ranges 
from 0 to 1,500 across quota markets, the median being 138 sales. Quota markets with low 
activity tend to be of low economic importance in the size and value of the catch. In many cases, 
these minor markets were designed more for political and biological reasons than for maximizing 
economic gains (Boyd and Dewees 1992; Annala 1996). 
3.3.  Price Dispersion 
Although we find evidence suggesting that there are ample participants and liquidity over 
the history of the ITQ system to support a competitive market, this does not rule out the 
possibility that significant price variation still exists.  In theory, if the quota markets are 
competitive with low transaction costs, buyers have incentives to bid away any differences in 
prices.  In practice, however, price dispersion on the order of 5% to 30% or more can exist, even 
for commonplace commodities, such as concrete, calculators, and fuel oil  (Pratt et al. 1979).  
The art print market reportedly has price variation ranging from 18% to 59% (Pesando 1993).  
Unlike more conventional assets and commodities, which will have existed for long periods of 
time, we would not necessarily expect to find fishing quota prices converging to a single price 
initially.  In these quota markets, price variation is likely due in part to quota transactions taking 
place bilaterally or through a broker, leading to differences in transaction costs, search costs, and 
bargaining power.  Nonetheless, the variation should go down over time as the market develops 
and fishermen and intermediaries learn how to operate in the newly created market.   
When investigating price dispersion, one must first choose a time window within which 
to consider prices to be comparable.  Taking a longer time step introduces more observations into 
each calculation; however, it also increases the chances of grouping observations that are not 
truly comparable.   We focus on observations within one month blocks of time and measure price 
dispersion as the mean absolute percentage price difference between the individual trade prices 
and the monthly mean for its fish stock.  The trends in price dispersion for both the lease and sale  17
markets are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the annual mean price dispersion across fish 
stock markets. 
We find that on average, deviations of about 35% around the mean existed in 1987 for 
both the sale and lease markets, but that this variation has decreased over time.  By 2000, the 
average sale price dispersion had fallen to under 15% while the average lease price dispersion 
fell to around 28%.  The relatively larger dispersion in the lease market is possibly due to 
intraseason variability in fishing conditions or other short-term considerations that would not 
affect the sale price. Dispersion which reflects real differences in the characteristics of the asset 
being traded do not of course indicate inefficiency, but rather that the prices are not fully 
comparable. We also see a downward trend in the first interquartile range, implying that the 
variability in price dispersion across fish stocks is also decreasing. Over the history of the 
program, the average interquartile range is about 18% for lease prices and 16% for sale prices.     
It is difficult to conclude whether the dispersion we observe is worrisome relative to other 
markets.  Our results regarding the magnitude of the price dispersion, which falls within the 
range reported in the literature for more commonplace markets, suggests that the precision of the 
price signal sent in these markets is on par with others that are typically thought to be well-
functioning.  The downward trend in price dispersion is also reassuring and suggests learning in 
these markets.   Nonetheless, price dispersion could potentially be reduced through the creation 
of a central trading exchange that posts bid and ask prices and levels of trading activity. With a 
clearer signal from the market, the ability of quota owners and fishery managers to ascertain 
relevant economic and biological information would improve.   
4.  Analysis of Fundamentals Determining Market Prices  
A crucial question in gauging the performance of quota markets is whether market prices 
behave in an economically reasonable manner. We assess quota price behavior in several ways. 
We begin by econometrically estimating the relationship between quota lease prices and  18
underlying fundamentals that theory would tell us should determine these prices. We do the same 
for quota sale prices. Finally, we evaluate the relationship between quota lease and sale prices, 
which in an efficient market would be related to the market interest rate through arbitrage.  
4.1.  Empirical Specification of Quota Prices  
In a competitive quota market, each fishing enterprise has an incentive to lease or trade 
quotas until it attains just enough quotas to cover a catch level that maximizes its expected 
profits. The price of a one-year lease on the right to catch one ton of fish should therefore equal 
the marginal flow of profit or rent from that enterprise, that is, the price of fish minus the 
marginal cost of fishing.25  The price of holding that right in perpetuity (i.e., the quota sale price) 
should likewise equal the discounted expected rent.  Thus, as we explore further below, the quota 
sale price should roughly equal the lease price divided by the market rate of interest, assuming 
expected lease prices are relatively constant.  If lease prices are expected to rise or fall because of 
changing economic or biological conditions, the quota sale price would be correspondingly 
higher or lower. 
In a deterministic setting, quota prices would depend on fish prices, factor prices, and 
factors underlying the technical relationship between fishing effort and the amount of fish 
caught, such as gear types, species biological characteristics, and climatic conditions.  The 
specific role played by these factors could be modeled by specifying functional forms for the 
fishing production function and the biological relationship between catch and the population of 
fish.  In practice, however, the inherent uncertainty surrounding fishing activities, biological 
                                                 
25 More formally, let annual fishing profits for firm k be given by  ()
kkkk pqcq p =- , where p is the given price per 
ton received for fish at the dock, qk is the tonnage of fish caught, and  ()
kk cq  is a function representing the cost of 
catching qk tons. Maximizing profits with respect to qk, subject to the constraint that the fisherman holds enough 
quota to cover his catch, he will be willing to pay (or accept) l for a marginal unit of quota, where l is equal to the 
marginal profit flow or rent,  ()
kk pcq l ¢ =- .  In a competitive equilibrium, l would equal the quota lease price.  For 
a more detailed derivation of the market equilibrium, see Clark (1990).  19
populations, and the evolving availability of information on demand in an ITQ market are very 
difficult to capture in a fully structural manner, especially if the ultimate desire is a basis for 
empirical estimation across many species, regions, and time.   
We therefore take a reduced-form approach, employing a flexible functional form of key 
variables to approximate the relationship between quota prices and their determinants.  Our 
choice of functional form was designed to allow for joint estimation of a range of fish stock 
markets with a wide range of scales (e.g., in terms of prices and catch levels), to provide a 
reasonable fit of the data, to allow relatively transparent interpretation of the parameter 
estimates, and to be parsimonious.26 We therefore enter all variables in a form that yields 
percentage relationships, which we accomplish by taking natural logarithms in some cases but 
not in those where the variable is already a percentage or a rate.27  After laying out the 
specification below, we further explain its rationale. 
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where l is the quarterly average lease price, p is the contemporaneous export price, c is an index 
of fishing costs, H is the actual annual catch, Q is the annual total allowable catch (TAC), h is the 
actual quarterly catch, s is the absolute value of the Southern Oscillation Index, g is the New 
                                                 
26 While we believe it is appropriate to take an aggregate pooled approach in this initial investigation of quota price 
determinants, there is clear value in future work that explores differences in relationships at a more dissagregated 
species or fishing stock level. 
27 Box-cox estimation supported the use of a logarithmic specification.  We did not include quadratic terms for 
several variables where they were estimated to be small and statistically insignificant and where there was no clear 
theoretical rationale for their inclusion.  20
Zealand real GDP growth rate, t is an annual time index, R indicates if the fish stock faced 
significant reductions upon implementation of the ITQ program ( R %  indicates the opposite), a0 is 
a constant term, a1 are individual fish stock market fixed effects, and a2 are fixed effects for 
successive quarters within each fishing year. Species are denoted by the subscript i and regions 
by j, so that each ij combination indexes a different fishing quota market. Time is indexed by 
quarter m of year y. We also estimate a model without individual fixed effects, where we instead 
include fixed effects for each geographic region as well as a measure of each species mortality 
rate.  
We would expect the export price28 of fish to be positively associated with quota prices, a 
relationship that is clearly illustrated in Figure 4, which shows a roughly linear relationship in 
logs between both quota lease and sale prices and fish export prices. In principal, the relevant 
price of fish for decisions regarding the value of a lease of duration one year or less is the price 
of fish at the expected time of landing. Without any clearly preferable alternative for measuring 
this expected price, we simply employ the contemporaneous export price of fish at the time the 
transaction was made.29  In practice, given the short time period for leases (one year or less), we 
consider this quite reasonable.  
For fishing costs we include an input price index for New Zealand fishing over time, 
including labor, fuel, and material costs.  These costs fell by about 20 percent over the late 1980s 
                                                 
28 Although we would ideally like to use dock or port prices for fish rather than export prices, adequate port price 
data do not exist. In practice, however, we find that export prices are an excellent proxy for the port price. Using a 
New Zealand government survey of port prices for specific fish stocks in 1998, we find that there is a 95% 
correlation between export prices and port prices. 
29 Orazem and Miranowski (1986), for example, provide an empirical strategy for testing competing hypotheses of 
expectations regimes when direct measures of expectations are unavailable. Applied to farm acreage allocation 
decisions as a function of expected commodity prices, it yielded little evidence for favoring any of the three regimes 
they tested.  Another issue raised by the use of the contemporaneous fish export price is potential for endogeneity.  
We believe it is reasonable to treat the fish export prices as given world prices because New Zealand exports about 
90% of its commercial catch and is less than 1% of world fishing output.  Even in the small number of cases where 
individual New Zealand species may comprise a more sizeable fraction of the world catch of those species, these 
species have many near-perfect substitutes in the form of other “white fish.”    21
and early 1990s, but rose again by about half that in the late 1990s due largely to fuel price 
increases.  The individual fixed effects we include will control for much of the cross-sectional 
factors that affect costs, including differences in fishing techniques for different species (e.g., 
gear) and regional costs differences (e.g., transportation costs and oceanographic conditions).30  
In addition, we include variables that capture differences in relative quota demand within and 
between fish stocks over time.  Because the supply of quotas is fixed, this variation will be 
driven largely by differences in costs.  For example, there are several fishing quota markets for 
red snapper, each corresponding to a different region.  We would expect that in regions where 
the costs of red snapper fishing are higher—perhaps because of the distance from port to the 
fishing grounds—the demand for red snapper quotas in those regions will be lower, all else 
equal.  In turn, we would expect that the lease price for these relatively undesirable quotas would 
be correspondingly lower. 
The first measure of quota demand is the prior year’s percentage caught of the TAC 
(Hijy-1 Qijy-1).  Although in a deterministic world one might expect the quota price to be zero for 
a fish stock with a non-binding TAC constraint, this will not be the case where uncertainty gives 
rise to option value.31 Uncertainty in the future profitability of fishing (e.g., because of export 
price and ecological uncertainty) makes it impossible for firms to know precisely how many 
quotas they will need in aggregate over the course of the year. Over half of the quotas are leased 
and sold in the first quarter of the fishing year—quotas that may turn out to be unprofitable to 
catch against. In addition, uncertainty in fishing conditions and government penalties for 
overfishing provide incentives for firms to keep their catch below their quota holdings. This 
                                                 
30 In an ideal scenario, we would have direct measures of firm-specific marginal costs of fishing over time, but the 
data unfortunately do not exist. 
31 In this respect quota have option-like characteristics.  The quota do not entitle the owner to a specific amount of 
fish, but rather to the option to catch and keep a specific amount of fish if it should prove profitable.  Anderson 
(1987) develops the theoretical underpinnings of “quotas as options” within an international trade context, showing 
among other things how even non-binding quota can have positive prices.  22
phenomenon has also been evidenced in so-called over-compliance by firms facing pollution 
control standards (Oates et al. 1989). 
The second measure of quota demand updates the first by measuring the year-to-date 
percentage caught of the TAC relative to the prior year ( hijny n =1
m-1 ￿ Qijy- hijny-1 n=1
m-1 ￿ Qijy-1). In 
other words, the second factor measures the additional information available at some point 
within the fishing year that is incremental to what was available at the start of the fishing year. 
Since both higher demand (H) and lower supply (Q) are associated with greater scarcity and 
higher prices, we would expect both of these variables to have a positive influence on quota 
prices.  
We also include an interaction effect between  Hijy-1 Qijy-1 and lnpimy to allow the 
relationship between the quota price and the export price to vary based on the degree to which 
the TAC is binding. When the percentage caught of the TAC is higher, we would expect the 
relationship between quota prices and export prices to be stronger, suggesting a positive sign for 
the parameter estimate on this variable. 
We include additional variables, depending on the specification, to assess the effect of 
ecological uncertainty on quota prices; one is biological and the other climatic.  The biological 
variable is the mortality rate for each species, which gives the percentage of the fish population 
that dies annually of natural causes. It is included only in the specification without individual 
fixed effects because it is not identified in the other specification.  Species with higher mortality 
rates have population sizes that are more variable, which leads to greater uncertainty in the 
amount of fish likely to be caught with a given level of effort.32 As a consequence, there is 
greater uncertainty in the profits from fishing high-mortality species, and we would expect the 
                                                 
32 In fact, the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries uses the mortality rate to construct a measure of natural variability 
that is factored into the setting of the TAC (Annala et al 2000). The assumption is that a stock with higher natural 
mortality will have fewer age classes and therefore will suffer greater fluctuations in biomass.  23
mortality rate to have a negative effect on quota prices due to curvature in the profit function33 
and risk aversion. The climatic variable we include is the Southern Oscillation Index, a time-
series measure of variability in water temperature and pressure.34 Water temperature significantly 
influences fish ecology and location and is an important variable used by the fishing industry 
when assessing the productivity of fisheries. We would expect that greater variation in the 
Southern Oscillation Index would be associated with more uncertain profitability of fishing and 
thus would have a negative effect on quota prices.   
We also include fixed effects for each individual fish stock, as well as seasonal effects 
(by quarter).  We also estimate a model without individual fixed effects, instead including 
regional effects which should to a certain extent control for fishing cost differences, especially 
those related to transportation.  This alternative specification may be of particular interest if one 
is interested in prediction beyond the sample population, as well as better understanding the 
source of cross-sectional differences in quota prices.  In addition, we include New Zealand’s real 
GDP growth rate to control for changes in the general state of the New Zealand economy, which 
affects corporate profitability and tends to be correlated with asset prices. 
If the tradable quota system actually delivers on its most important promise—increased 
profitability of the fisheries through stock rebuilding and cost rationalization—we would expect 
the time effects in our model to be generally positive and increasing. That is, once we have 
controlled for changes in fish prices, fishing input prices, and other important factors in our 
                                                 
33 If there is a “stock effect” in the cost function for fishing, stock uncertainty will lead not only to variation in the 
profit function—which lowers the expected utility of profits in the presence of risk aversion—but also to a lower 
expected value of profits. 
34 It has been found that the cyclic warming and cooling of the eastern and central Pacific leave a distinctive 
fingerprint on sea level pressure. In particular, the difference between the pressure measured at Darwin and that 
measured at Tahiti can be used to generate an index number called the Southern Oscillation Index, which generally 
ranges from –35 to 35. When there is a positive number, we have La Niña (or ocean cooling), and when the number 
is negative we have an El Niño (or ocean warming).  24
analysis, the residual effect of time on quota prices should be positive as the system provides 
incentives for increased catch per unit effort and increased profitability. 35   
This should be particularly evident for fisheries that were plagued with excess capacity, 
were the most depleted, and therefore faced significant reductions in allowable catch at the outset 
of the ITQ program.  Most of the fishing stocks included in the program did not in fact face 
significant initial reductions in catch, but rather had TAC levels set based on historical levels.  
We therefore estimate separate time effects in our model for fishing stocks that faced significant 
initial reductions, versus those that did not.  We would expect the time effect to be significantly 
larger for the former, as these stocks should experience greater increases in profitability and 
quota prices, due to potential improvements in fish populations and the likelihood of significant 
gains from consolidation and trade.  Therefore, even though we do not have a control group of 
fisheries operating fully outside the ITQ system, we nonetheless have a natural experiment in the 
form of different fishing stocks facing varying degrees of government constraint on catch levels 
through the setting of  TACs.   
We also estimate an equation for quota sale prices. Earlier we pointed out that rational 
asset pricing theory suggests that the quota sale price should equal the discounted expected rent 
from fishing, or equivalently, the discounted flow of future expected lease prices. If lease prices 
are expected to remain relatively constant, then the sale price would simply equal the lease price 
divided by the relevant market rate of interest. If lease prices are expected to move up or down 
over time, however, because of changing export prices or costs, the relationship between lease 
and sale prices would be more complex, since it would depend on expectations of changing 
future conditions.  If, for example, rents (and lease prices) were expected to increase at a 
                                                 
35 Caution is always in order when interpreting time effects, however, and there are other unmeasured factors that 
could plausibly influence quota prices over time.  For example, there may also be an increase in the perceived 
security of quota assets over time, which could have a positive effect on quota sale prices but would not necessarily 
influence quota lease prices. There have also been policy changes over the history of New Zealand’s ITQ system 
that could affect prices in both positive and negative ways.  25
constant rate, then the lease price divided by the sale price would equal the discount rate minus 
the expected lease growth rate.    
A definitive analysis of quota sale price determinants and the relationship between lease 
and sale prices may therefore require carefully modeling future expectations of prices and costs, 
an endeavor that is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, we believe it is useful to 
investigate the determinants of quota sale prices, as well as the relationship between sale and 
lease prices, assuming that recent conditions in the fishery provide an adequate representation of 
future expectations. Under these conditions, quota sale prices should be roughly equal to lease 
prices divided by the interest rate (minus any expected growth rate in lease prices)—which 
would be swept into the constant term after taking logs. We therefore estimate a quota sale price 
equation whose explanatory variables are identical to the lease price equation described above.   
4.2.  Data and Estimation 
We estimate Equation (1) using a comprehensive panel dataset of information we 
constructed from New Zealand government agencies and other sources for the period 1986–
1999. All monetary figures were adjusted for inflation to year 2000 New Zealand dollars. A 
detailed description of the variables in the dataset and their sources is provided in the Data 
Appendix. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the included variables, which exhibit a large 
degree of variation. The number of transactions underlying each quarterly average observation is 
14 leases and 4 sales on average, ranging from 1 to 192 leases and 1 to 75 sales.  Note that due to 
the presence of quadratic terms in the estimated equation, we also normalize certain variables to 
ease interpretation of the parameter estimates.36  
                                                 
36 We normalize the export price so that its normalized mean equals unity, or zero after taking natural logarithms. 
We normalize the lagged annual percent caught by subtracting 1, so that it equals zero when the TAC is fully 
binding (i.e., when H/Q = 100%). We also take the absolute value of the Southern Oscillation Index because we are 
interested not in the sign of the index but rather in its magnitude as an indication of climatic variability.  26
We estimate separate equations for lease prices and sale prices using feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS), wherein the covariance matrix of the disturbances is adjusted in three 
ways. First, we weight the disturbances by the number of transactions underlying each 
observation, which is a quarterly average.37 Weighting in this manner will correct for 
heteroskedasticity because averages based on more observations will have lower variance. 
Second, we use the multiple observations for each fish stock to construct separate stock-specific 
variance estimates; this allows us to weight the lower-variance fish stocks more heavily. Finally, 
we use the time-series structure of the observations to make separate stock-specific corrections 
for autocorrelation.38 More restrictive error structures were rejected by likelihood ratio tests. 
Estimation uses a two-step procedure, in which the first step residuals from OLS (weighted using 
the number of transactions) are used to determine the sample variance and first-order serial 
correlation for each fish stock; these components, together with the transaction weights, yield the 
complete weighting matrix. In the second step the complete weighting matrix is used in FGLS 
estimation of the parameters.   
4.3.  Results 
The estimation results for both quota lease and sale prices for models both with and 
without individual fish stock fixed effects are presented in Table 3. Overall, the results are 
consistent with economic expectations about the parameters.  The estimated coefficients 
generally have the expected signs and reasonable magnitudes and are consistent across both the 
lease and the sale price equations.  The results confirm that quota prices increase with increasing 
prices for fish and increased quota demand, and decrease with increasing costs and ecological 
                                                 
37 The results are robust to the use of other averaging periods (e.g., months) or the use of individual transactions.  
We chose to use an average rather than individual observations because it allowed us to more readily treat the 
covariance structure of the model.  We chose to use quarterly averages because it represented a desirable balance 
between parsimony and avoiding the omission of useful variation.  
38 The overall sample autocorrelation for lease prices was 0.21, and 0.38 for sale prices, both of which were 
significant according to Durbin Watson and Breusch Godfrey tests and also differed substantially across panels.   27
uncertainty.  The time effects indicate a substantial increase in quota prices since the ITQ system 
was established, consistent with an increase in the profitability of the fisheries. These quota price 
increases have been significantly greater for stocks that faced significant reductions in allowable 
catch levels. The qualitative results are robust to changes in the functional form and the error 
structure employed.39 
These results are compelling for a number of reasons.  First, with an equivalent OLS 
estimation of our model, we explain 95% of the variation in lease prices and 92% in sale prices.  
While one always has to be careful not to place too much emphasis on R
2 values, the model’s 
explanatory power appears quite high.  Second, the parameter estimates are largely consistent 
across the lease and sale price equations, although the estimates for variables more susceptible to 
short-run fluctuations tend to be larger in the lease than sale equation, as one would expect.  
Together these results support the assumption implicit in our sale price equation that 
contemporaneous conditions are a significant determinant of fishermen’s expectations about 
future conditions.  Finally,  we find that prices do reflect underlying fundamentals, suggesting 
that the price signals from these markets contain valuable information for managers and 
fishermen. 
After controlling for other important factors, we find that the elasticity of the quota price 
with respect to the fish export price is positive and statistically significant in both lease and sale 
prices equations. As expected, species with higher export prices also tend to have proportionately 
higher quota prices. The magnitude of the export price elasticity is also consistent across the two 
quota price equations (b1 = 0.2 at the mean export price).  It is much less than the elasticity of 
                                                 
39 We also explored whether the option of paying “deemed values” in lieu of holding quota to cover catches resulted 
in any bias to our results (see footnote 14).  In principle the deemed value can censor the quota lease price by acting 
as a price ceiling if conditions would otherwise lead the lease price to exceed the deemed value.  This could lead to 
the usual bias in means and variances that gave rise to the Tobit and other models for handling censored data.  In 
practice, we found that only around 1 percent of our lease price observations approached the level of the deemed 
value.  Furthermore, the results were not sensitive to treating these observations as censored.  28
about 1 evident from Figure 4 and  the estimation results without fixed effects in Table 3, 
indicating that quota prices are much more sensitive to long-term cross-sectional differences in 
export prices than they are to fluctuations in export prices within species over time. Changes in 
fishing costs had the expected effect on quota prices, with higher costs being associated with 
lower quota values.  The effect was substantially lower for sale prices, and statistically 
insignificant in the individual fixed effects model for sale prices.  This is possibly attributable to 
the perception that input price fluctuations may be short-lived, since they are due in part to 
changing fuel prices.   
The coefficient b4 gives the elasticity of the quota price with respect to the percent caught 
of the TAC in the previous year, a measure of relative quota demand.40  The elasticity is similar 
in magnitude across the two equations and is positive and economically and statistically 
significant; b4 = 0.4 at the point where the TAC is binding (i.e., H/Q = 100%).  For the rare cases 
where the catch exceeded the TAC, the negative coefficient on the squared percentage caught 
(b5) indicates that further increases in the percentage caught above 100% have a significantly 
lesser effect on quota prices, but further decreases in the percentage caught below 100% have an 
increasingly negative effect on quota prices. These results make economic sense because catches 
above the TAC are rare and short-lived and should therefore have a lessened effect on quota 
prices. On the other hand, fish stocks where the TAC is not binding can persist for long periods.  
Very low percentage catches are indicative of fish stocks with little expected quota demand (e.g., 
due to high costs), and thus quota prices should move quickly toward zero.  As expected, the 
coefficient on the interaction of this variable with the logged export price (b8) is positive.  Our 
second measure of quota demand—which updates the first by measuring the year-to-date 
                                                 
40  We measure these variables as capturing quota demand and therefore, we expect a positive sign.  The 
interpretation that these variables capture differences in costs would require us to measure the quota demand 
variables inversely yielding, as expected, a negative correlation with lease prices.   29
percentage caught of the TAC relative to the prior year—also had the expected positive effect on 
quota prices and is statistically significant.   
  One measure of ecological uncertainty, the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI), had a 
negligible relationship with quota prices.  A complexity with measuring the influence of the SOI 
is that each species is expected to respond differently and over different time frames to this 
index.  This requires a more disaggregated approach and careful treatment of the relationship 
between individual species abundance and oceanographic variables—an analysis that is beyond 
the current exploration. We found that species with higher mortality rates had significantly lower 
quota prices, other things equal, although we could only estimate this effect in the model without 
individual effects.  The elasticity was –1.2 for lease prices and –0.7 for sale prices. These results 
are consistent with the idea that species with higher mortality rates have more variability in their 
populations, which leads to greater profit variability and in turn lower quota prices.    
Higher quota prices were also significantly associated with periods of higher GDP 
growth.  Controlling for the above factors, there is also evidence of increased profitability of the 
included fisheries since the establishment of the ITQ system. Recall that since we have 
controlled for changes in export prices and fishing input prices over time, as well as other 
important factors, the residual effect of time should capture stock rebuilding and gains from trade 
leading to increased profitability.  That is, positive time effects indicate rising quota prices, 
controlling for other factors.41   The collection of stocks that faced initial reductions in allowable 
catch also experienced significant consolidation, with the median fish stock having a 38% 
reduction in the number of owners.  For these stocks, we estimate that lease prices rose at an 
                                                 
41 To measure the total increase in profitability from the implementation of the ITQ system, we would actually not 
want to control for increases in the price of fish attributable to a new emphasis on product quality, nor cost changes 
due to individual owner’s investments in cost-saving technology.   While these revenue and cost gains may not be 
due to stock rebuilding or gains from trade, individual catching rights is a critical factor in the ability to capture these 
gains.  Without the rights, race-to-fish conditions would persist and these gains would tend to be dissipated by 
vessels entering the fishery.  30
average rate of 4% and sale prices by 10% annually since the program started, holding other 
factors constant.  For the other collection of stocks, which saw only a median 12% reduction in 
the number of owners, we estimate that lease prices rose a more modest 0.6% annually and sale 
prices by 6% annually, all else equal.42  
Regardless of the specification employed, we found that quota sale prices have risen to a 
greater degree than quota leases prices.  The greater increase in quota sale than lease prices can 
be at least partly attributed to decreases in the market interest rate, which fell from about 11% to 
3% real over the relevant period.   As mentioned earlier, increases in quota sale prices could also 
be driven in part by the perception of increased security of quota assets, although such an effect 
should not be important for quota lease prices. 
The relationship between quota lease prices, sale prices, and the rate of interest is 
illustrated in Figure 5.  The “expected rate of return” plotted in the figure is the median (across 
fish stocks) of the annual average lease price divided by the annual average sale price.43 Recall 
that in a competitive market the lease price should measure the annual profit flow, and the asset 
sale price should represent the present value of expected future profit flows. Assuming roughly 
constant expected future profit flows, the lease price divided by the sale price should be close to 
                                                 
42 We also estimated the fixed effects model with separate time effects for inshore, offshore, and shellfish fisheries.  
Historically, New Zealand’s inshore and shellfish fisheries were the most depleted and overcapitalized, and the 
offshore fishery was managed through a quota system prior to 1986. We would therefore expect the efficiency gains 
to be higher in the inshore and shellfish fisheries than offshore.   This is in fact what we find for both lease and sale 
prices, with quota price increases for shellfish (lease 6%, sale 15%), inshore (lease 2%, sale 6%) , and offshore 
(lease 0.4%, sale 4%), all else equal.  Our estimate that shellfish had the greatest rate of increase in quota prices is 
also consistent with evidence that the rock lobster fisheries have shown the clearest signs of stock rebuilding 
(Clement 1997). 
43 We do not include any realized capital gains or losses in our expected rate of return calculation.  If the lease price 
reflects the annual earnings from the quota, there should not be any expected capital gain due to retained earnings, as 
is the case for many shares of stock.  Furthermore, any anticipated increases or decreases in earnings (lease prices) 
or interest rates should be quickly capitalized in the quota asset price, implying that the expected future capital gain 
is zero.  One could of course test the proposition that capital gains in these markets are not forecastable using some 
version of the “predictability tests” employed in the finance literature regarding the efficient market hypothesis 
(Cochrane 2001)—an undertaking we intend for future research.  In any event, if capital gains are nonetheless 
included, this raises the realized rate of return by about 5% annually on average.  31
the market interest rate. Figure 5 supports the presence of this arbitrage relationship, with the 
computed expected rate of return tracking both the level and the trend in the market interest rate 
over the sample period. At the same time the expected rate of return fell by about half from 14% 
to 7%, the interest rate as measured by New Zealand Treasury bills fell from 11% to 3% real. If 
quota market participants were factoring in expected growth in lease prices, the actual expected 
rates of return would be higher than we have estimated ignoring such increases.  
Nonetheless, note that the results regarding quota sale prices and quota lease-sale 
relationships are subject to the earlier caveat that we have not thoroughly explored alternative 
assumptions about future expectations of rents. Rather, we have focused on a relatively simple 
assumption about expectations—that they are given by contemporaneous conditions.  Having 
said that, the consistent results across both the lease and sale markets suggests that our current 
approach is not unreasonable.  
5.  Conclusion 
Fisheries throughout the world are biologically and economically threatened not because 
fishermen are irrational, as many would contend, but because they are rational. Under the current 
system of regulated open access, it is in their best interest to catch as much as possible as fast as 
possible. ITQs are a promising means to ending the race to fish and rationalizing fisheries. At the 
same time, ITQs provide a vehicle by which fishermen can realize the potential gains of resource 
stewardship.   
Whether market-based instruments are being applied to fish, pollution, or other resource 
problems, the ability of firms to buy and sell quotas in a well-functioning market is necessary for 
achieving efficiency gains. In practice, one might worry that these markets may be thin or 
plagued with information problems. With very few empirical studies of created markets, it is 
often hard to counter these worries with anything more than anecdotal evidence. To further the  32
empirical record, we evaluate the operation of New Zealand’s market for fishing quotas, the 
largest system of its kind in the world.   
We typically observe both a sufficient number of market participants and high enough 
levels of market activity to support a competitive quota market. The level of activity has risen 
steadily over the years, consistent with the notion that the development of these markets takes 
time.  Not all is rosy, however—some markets have relatively few transactions, although these 
tend to be economically and ecologically unimportant fisheries.  Market thinness could be 
addressed through policy by aggregating illiquid quota markets into other quota markets.  The 
advantages of such aggregation would of course have to be considered along with any positive or 
negative biological, social, and administrative implications. 
We find that there has been substantial price dispersion within individual quota markets, 
but that the magnitude of this dispersion has gone down over time, particularly for quota sales, 
and is comparable to that found in other well-functioning markets. The trends are consistent with 
a period of market development where participants learn how to operate in the newly created 
market, and traders and brokers begin to set-up shop. Potentially, the observed dispersion could 
be reduced through establishment of a central trading exchange, thereby improving the quality of 
information for fishermen and fishery managers.  
 Our estimates indicate that prices in these markets are related in an expected manner 
with underlying economic fundamentals, including measures of fishing value, relative quota 
demand, ecological variability, and market rates of return. Our analysis of the market arbitrage 
relationship between quota lease and sale prices, for example, shows that the expected rate of 
return for quotas follows the general historical level and trend of New Zealand’s real rate of 
interest. Moreover, after controlling for relevant factors, our results show an increase in the value 
of quota prices over the history of the ITQ program, consistent with an increase in the 
profitability of the included fisheries.  This is particularly true for fishing stocks that were  33
initially overcapitalized and overfished and faced significant catch reductions from historic 
levels. 
The results are also relevant for ongoing policy developments in the United States, where 
the debate focuses in part on whether shares should be transferable. We can infer from the 
revealed behavior in the New Zealand ITQ market that the overall flexibility of the system and 
the ability to transfer shares has high economic value.  Furthermore, the flexibility provided to 
quota holders by having the option to lease appears to have significant value as revealed by the 
dramatic increase in leasing over time.  In addition, the opportunity to arbitrage across the sale 
and lease market provides an additional dimension across which relevant market information can 
be exchanged and rationalized. 
Overall, the evidence to date suggests a reasonable level of economic sophistication in 
these markets, implying that market-based quota systems are potentially effective instruments for 
efficient fisheries management. But important questions remain for future research. A more 
careful modeling of future expectations and variability of fish export prices, for example, might 
shed further light on the relationship between quota lease and sale prices, both in aggregate and 
as it pertains to individual fisheries. The implications of incidental catch of nontarget species and 
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Data Appendix 
Using information obtained from New Zealand government agencies and other sources, 
we assembled a comprehensive panel database of information on the New Zealand individual 
transferable quota (ITQ) system over the period 1986–1999. The data include information on the 
name of each fish stock, quota transactions (i.e., prices and quantities of quota leases and sales), 
the export prices of fish species covered by the ITQ system, quota ownership, the total allowable 
commercial catch (TAC) and actual catch for each fish stock, biological information on fish 
species, climatic variation, and interest rates. All monetary figures were adjusted for inflation to 
year 2000 New Zealand dollars using the producer price index (PPI) from Statistics New 
Zealand. A description of the variables included in the dataset and their sources follows.  
A.1  Species and Regions 
The New Zealand ITQ system covered 26 species when it began in 1986 and expanded to 
33 species by 1998. Where data allow, we include all 33 species in our analyses. Associated with 
these 33 species are 157 geographically distinct fish stock markets. Table 1 shows the species 
names, abbreviations, when they entered the ITQ system, and the number of associated fish 
stocks. For the econometric analysis of lease and sale prices, we can include only 30 species (141 
fish stocks) because export price data are unavailable for HPB, OYS, and STA. For the 
econometric analysis, we also include dummy variables for 8 regions, based on the geographic 
coverage of each fish stock (Paulin 1996; Clement & Associates 1997).  
A.2  Quota Transactions 
We acquired data from the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries on all individual leases 
and sales between quota holders from when the program began in late 1986 through 2001—more 
than 170,000 transactions altogether. To sell, purchase, lease, or sublease quotas, the individuals 
involved in the transaction must register a Notification of Sale and Purchase of Individual  40
Transferable Quota or a Notification of Lease or Sublease of Individual Transferable Quota with 
the appropriate agency, which includes information about the quota holders as well as the 
quantity and price per ton of the quotas sold or leased. 
Transaction Quantities. The transactions dataset includes the price and quantity of quotas 
transacted, the name and an identifier called the quota registration number for each party to the 
transaction, and the date of the transaction.  We use the transaction quantity data to measure the 
number of quotas that firms hold or own, how many quotas are being leased or sold, how many 
firms are active in the ITQ system, and related trends in firm entry and exit.  
As a first step, we consolidated certain quota registration numbers (QRNs) so that they 
better represented economically distinct behavioral units. Many firms transact quotas under 
several different QRNs (e.g., Abalone Quota Ltd. and Abalone Quota Holdings Ltd.), but the 
quotas are in reality under common management. After carefully scrutinizing the names, 
addresses, and other information for all 5,697 QRNs that existed at some point in the sample 
period, we consolidated many of them, for a total of 4,729 distinct units. This is an important 
step—one that few if any other analyses of these data have taken—because it influences all the 
market measures mentioned above (e.g., quantity of transfers, industry concentration, number of 
firms). Given our unique firm identifier, we used the transactions data to determine the year-end 
quantity of quotas that each firm owned in each fish stock as well as the quantity it held (i.e., 
taking account of leases in and out).  
Transaction Prices. The transactions dataset also contains the price per ton of quotas sold 
or leased, the relevant fish stock, and the transaction date; prices were available for 151,835 
leases and 25,210 sales. Some of the price data were unreliable because other assets (e.g., boats) 
were reportedly included in the sale price, or the transaction was not arms-length or was 
misreported. In all, we omitted 30% of lease and 25% of sale observations which did not  41
represent true market transactions.44 After adjusting for inflation using the PPI, we calculated the 
quarterly average lease and sale price for each fish stock.45 We also counted the number of 
transactions used in the creation of each quarterly average for use in our econometric estimation, 
which employs this number of underlying transactions as a statistical weight. 
A.3  Other Variables 
Export Prices. As a measure of the value of each fish species, we calculated its export 
price per greenweight ton using data from Statistics New Zealand over the period 1986–1999. 
After adjusting for inflation using the PPI, we created a quarterly export price by dividing the 
FOB revenue for each species by the greenweight tonnage of product. We computed the 
greenweight tonnage by multiplying exported tonnages—by product type (e.g., whole, fillets, 
lobster tails)—by official Ministry of Fisheries conversion factors (Clement & Associates 1997, 
1998), and then summing these for each species. 
Fishing Costs. Using data from Statistics New Zealand, we constructed an index of New 
Zealand fishing costs over time using the rates of change in real (PPI-deflated) labor and material 
(including fuel) costs for fishing, weighted by their shares in total variable costs (25% labor and 
75% materials (including fuel), according to New Zealand fishing industry contacts).  
TAC and Actual Catch. Both the total allowable commercial catch and the actual catch 
for each fish stock over time are from the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries. 
                                                 
44 We omitted all prices for transactions that were not between economically distinct parties, and for leases from the 
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (which are deliberately discounted).  We also omitted lease prices less 
than $1 per ton, sale prices less than $20 per ton, as well as a small number of prices that were unreasonably high 
(which likely contain other assets).  We also omitted prices for bundled transactions involving multiple types of 
quota, where the reported price was simply a constant average value for all quota.  In any event, whether or not we 
omitted observations did not alter the qualitative results, and it changed the quantitative magnitudes only to a small 
degree. 
45 An alternative would be to calculate a weighted average price, using the quantity of each transaction as its weight. 
We found that this alternative price measure was not substantially different from the straight average and had the 
disadvantage of not leading to a clear weighting procedure for our econometric analysis.  42
Real Interest Rates and GDP. For comparison purposes in our analysis of expected rates 
of return, we use the 90-day New Zealand Treasury bill rate from the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, adjusted using the New Zealand CPI to create an annual real interest rate.  The real 
GDP growth rate for New Zealand is from Statistics New Zealand. 
Ecological Variables. Species mortality data are from a compilation by Froese and Pauly 
(2000) and Annala et. al.(2000). As a measure of climate variation, we obtained monthly values 
for the Southern Oscillation Index from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, from which we 
computed quarterly averages (http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/current/soihtm1.shtml).  We 
classified fish stocks as to whether they faced significant initial catch reductions under ITQs by 
using historical information on catch rates, TAC levels, and references in the literature (Annala 
et al 2000; Clark, Major, and Mollett 1988; Major 1999; Clement & Associates 1997).  The 
following 33 fish stocks were so classified: CRA1-5, CRA7-8, BNS2, ELE3-5, JDO1, MOK1-3, 
ORH2B, SCH1-3, SCH5, SCH7-8 SKI3, SNA1-2,  SNA8, SPO1-3, SPO7-8, TRE1, HPB2-3.  43
Table 1. Species Included in the New Zealand ITQ System as of 1998 
Species  Abbreviation  Year entered  Fish stocks  Species type 
Barracouta  BAR  1986  4  Offshore 
Blue cod  BCO  1986  7  Inshore 
Bluenose  BNS  1986  5  Inshore 
Alfonsino  BYX  1986  5  Inshore 
Rock lobster  CRA  1990  9  Shellfish 
Elephant fish  ELE  1986  5  Inshore 
Flatfish  FLA  1986  4  Inshore 
Grey mullet  GMU  1986  4  Inshore 
Red gurnard  GUR  1986  5  Inshore 
Hake  HAK  1986  3  Offshore 
Hoki  HOK  1986  1  Offshore 
Hapuku and bass  HPB  1986  7  Inshore 
John Dory  JDO  1986  4  Inshore 
Jack mackerel  JMA  1987  3  Offshore 
Ling  LIN  1986  7  Offshore 
Blue moki  MOK  1986  4  Inshore 
Oreo  OEO  1986  4  Offshore 
Orange roughy  ORH  1986  7  Offshore 
Oyster  OYS  1996  2  Shellfish 
Paua (abalone)  PAU  1987  10  Shellfish 
Packhorse rock lobster  PHC  1990  1  Shellfish 
Red cod  RCO  1986  4  Inshore 
Scallops  SCA  1992  2  Shellfish 
School shark  SCH  1986  7  Inshore 
Gemfish  SKI  1986  4  Offshore 
Snapper  SNA  1986  5  Inshore 
Rig  SPO  1986  5  Inshore 
Squid  SQU  1987  3  Offshore 
Stargazer  STA  1986  7  Inshore 
Silver warehou  SWA  1986  3  Offshore 
Tarakihi  TAR  1986  7  Inshore 
Trevally  TRE  1986  4  Inshore 
Blue warehou  WAR  1986  5  Offshore 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Determinants of Fishing Quota Prices 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max. 
Lease price ($/ton)  1,738  4,321  1  43,663 
Sale price ($/ton)  21,216  48,585  22  358,586 
Export price ($/ton)  7,592  11,246  311  60,263 
Catch (tons/year)  3,992  20,814  0  268,633 
Total allowable commercial catch (tons/year)  5,154  23,416  1  251,883 
Percentage catch  0.76  0.35  0.00  5.09 
Percentage cumulative catch over prior year  0.01  0.13  -1.07  3.11 
Mortality rate  0.30  0.22  0.05  1.00 
Southern Oscillation Index  -2.6  10.2  -23.7  15.47 
Fishing cost index (index = 1 in Jan. 1986)  0.85  0.04  0.79  1.00 
GDP annual growth rate  0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.07 
Number of leases per quarter  14  17  1  192 
Number of sales per quarter  4  5  1  75 
 
Note: Statistics are based on the sample from the estimation of quota lease price determinants, with the exception of 
sale price and the number of sales, which are based on the sample from the estimation of quota sale price 
determinants. Monetary figures are year 2000 NZ dollars, which are typically worth about half a U.S. dollar. Tons 



























Table 3. Determinants of Fishing Quota Lease and Sale Prices 
Fixed effects  No fixed effects 
Variables  Lease  Sale  Lease  Sale 
Price of fish         
























Quota demand         








































Ecological uncertainty         
Natural Mortality Rate 













Quota price trends           
Fisheries with initial reductions in TAC  









Other fisheries  









Reduced TAC  





















Fish stock fixed effects  jointly 
significant 
jointly 
significant  —  — 
Regional effects 













Number of quarterly observations     6,010     4,161  6,010    4,161 
 
Note: The dependent variables are the average quarterly lease and sale prices. The data are a panel of observations 
for species- and region-differentiated quota markets over 15 years. The R
2 for the comparable OLS estimates for the 
fixed effect (no fixed effect) lease price equation is 0.95 (0.88) and for the sale price equation is 0.92 (0.85). 
Estimation method is feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), including heteroskedastic errors with first-order 
serial correlation, differentiated by panel, and weighted using the number of transactions underlying each quarterly 
average price. There are 141 panels for the lease price equation and 139 for the sale price equation.  Some variables 
are normalized to ease interpretation. See Data Appendix for further detail.    46
Figure 1: Trends in the Number of Quota Owners 







































Figure 2. Trends in the Portion of Quota that are Leased and Sold 
Note: Annual median across fish stocks of the net percent of quota owned that is leased and sold by 
















































Figure 3:  Trends in Lease and Sale Price Dispersion 
Note:  Price dispersion is measured as the annual average of the mean percent absolute deviation of each 
































 Sale Prices 49
 
Figure 4. Quota Lease Prices, Quota Sale Prices, and Fish Export Prices 
Note: Logarithmic scale. Averages by species for the 1998/1999 fishing year. Year 2000 NZ$. Data 
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Figure 5. Expected Rate of Return for Quota and Market Interest Rates 
 
Note: Rates of return are medians across fish stocks in each year. The interest rate is based on New 
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